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If You Will It, It Is No Dream:
1
 Balancing Public 
Policy and Testamentary Freedom 
Orly Henry* 
ABSTRACT 
 In September 2009, the Supreme Court of Illinois issued an opinion in the case of 
In re Estate of Feinberg, which explores the limits of testamentary freedom where a 
private will intersects with the public policy of the state of Illinois.  The supreme court 
reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that a grandchild could be deemed deceased 
for the purposes of a will where the grandchild violated the beneficiary restriction clause, 
which required that the grandchild be married either to a person of the Jewish faith or to 
a spouse that converted to Judaism within a year after marriage to be eligible to receive 
their bequest.  The Illinois supreme court based its decision on the fact that (1) several 
Illinois statutes support broad testamentary freedom, (2) the cases used to support the 
appellate court’s decision were inapposite, and (3) the Restatement (Third) of Trusts was 
inapplicable because the provision in question was from a will, not a trust.  This Note 
attempts to analyze and evaluate the supreme court’s decision. 
 The supreme court’s opinion was narrowly tailored to the facts of the Feinberg 
case and thus leaves many open questions.  This Note analyzes the court’s decision and 
argues that the Feinberg decision should be broadly construed; in particular, courts 
should apply the Feinberg precedent to future cases involving trust provisions and where 
the plaintiff is an heir at law.  Moreover, attorneys and testators should consider closely 
the implications of Feinberg and either draft restrictive testamentary provisions carefully 
to avoid violating public policy or promote personal beliefs and values using other means 
that are less susceptible to being challenged in court. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On September 24, 2009, the Illinois Supreme Court decided In re Estate of 
Feinberg, a case which explores the limits of testamentary freedom where a private 
document, a will, intersects with the public policy of the state of Illinois.
2
  This case pit 
family member against family member, calling into question personal life decisions, 
including one’s choice of spouse.  The case is also personal because the testamentary 
provision in question was an expression of the testators’ lifelong dedication to their 
                                               
1 This phrase, a Zionist slogan, was adapted from the title page of Theodor Herzl’s Old-New Land.  
THEODOR HERZL, OLD-NEW LAND (―ALTNEULAND‖) (Lotta Levensohn, trans., 2nd ed. 1960).  The original 
phrase is ―If you will it, it is no fable.‖  Id.  
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2011, Northwestern University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2007, 
Washington University in St. Louis.  Special thanks to Ken Henry for inspiration and feedback at all stages 
of the writing process.  Thanks also to Keita de Souza; Zachary Luck; Rachel Lindner; and Ashley Mangus 
for their valuable comments. 
2 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009). 
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religious tradition and their desire to see their grandchildren perpetuate the same 
tradition.  At the same time, this case also addresses broader concerns, examining Illinois 
public policy and how far it extends into the private sphere. 
¶2 Feinberg involves the wills of Max and Erla Feinberg, both of whom were 
deceased.
3
  They were both deeply committed to Judaism and sought to ―encourage and 
support Judaism and preservation of Jewish culture.‖
4
  To that end, Max created a trust 
which contained a beneficiary restriction clause,
5
 a provision that conditioned the receipt 
of an inheritance by each of their five grandchildren on whether or not each grandchild 
married a spouse of the Jewish faith (or someone who converted to Judaism within one 
year of marriage).
6
  As a result of the clause, only one grandchild
7
 was eligible to receive 
any money from the estate.
8
  In Feinberg, the case brought by disinherited granddaughter 
Michele Trull to challenge the beneficiary restriction clause, the Illinois Supreme Court 
explored whether the clause should be upheld or voided as contrary to public policy.
9
 
¶3 Public policy in Illinois is to support, encourage, and safeguard the institution of 
marriage, and to promote marital harmony where possible.
10
  However, the state of 
Illinois also supports broad testamentary freedom, meaning that testators are generally 
given wide latitude to do as they please within the limits of the law and the state’s public 
policy.
11
  Beneficiary restriction clauses and other similar testamentary provisions can 
present an issue of public policy because these clauses may be disruptive to marital 
harmony, whether or not the testator intended such an effect.  These clauses can be 
construed as coercive, forcing potential beneficiaries to choose between an inheritance 
and a love that does not meet the conditions of the clause. 
¶4 In re Estate of Feinberg is worthy of study because of the competing interests it 
presents and the extensive interest and commentary that it precipitated as it wended its 
way through the Illinois state court system.
12
  For obvious reasons, many feel strongly 
                                               
3 Id. at 890.  Max passed away in 1986.  Id. at 891.  Erla passed away in 2003.  Id. at 892.  
4 Id. at 893. 
5 The Illinois Supreme Court used the term ―beneficiary restriction clause‖ to refer to the provision which 
conditioned the descendants’ receipt of their inheritance on whether or not they married someone who was 
Jewish or converted to Judaism within one year of marriage.  See id. at 891.  Therefore, this note has 
adopted that term as well. 
6 Id. at 891. 
7 Id. at 892.  Four of the five grandchildren married non-Jewish spouses who did not convert to Judaism 
within a year of marriage.  Id. 
8
Id. 
9 Following Erla’s 2003 death, several suits were brought with regards to the Feinberg estate, pitting the 
executors against the disinherited grandchildren.  One of the grandchildren accused Michael, Leila, and 
Leila’s husband of prematurely accessing Erla’s funds.  Aaron Gavant, In re Estate of Feinberg: Even When 
You Will It, It’s Still a Dream, JEWISH LAW, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/evenWhenYouWillIt.pdf.  
Another grandchild accused Leila Feinberg of misusing family funds.  Id.  However, the courts considered 
only the issue of whether or not the beneficiary restriction clause was void as against public policy.  Id.    
10 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 897. 
11 Id. at 895 (―[O]ur statutes clearly reveal a public policy in support of testamentary freedom.‖). 
12 Feinberg has garnered much attention, both within and outside of legal circles.  Recognizing the interest 
of religious organizations in the case, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed three Jewish organizations, 
Agudath Israel of America, National Council of Young Israel and Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America, to submit an amicus brief together.  Brief for Agudath Israel of America et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009) (No. 106982).  
The amici curiae approached the case from a religious perspective, arguing that the provision should be 
upheld based on public policy in favor of testamentary freedom and in favor of free exercise of religion, the 
Vol. 6:1] Orly Henry 
217 
that individuals should be able to distribute their money and assets as they please with 
minimal interference from the government.
13
  Yet, at the same time, many believe 
strongly that individuals should have the freedom to make their own life choices without 
undue outside influence exerted through dead-hand control
14
 in the form of a beneficiary 
restriction clause.  Feinberg pits these two competing and compelling social interests in 
direct opposition.   
¶5 Beyond the mere facts of the Feinberg case, those who study the law of estates and 
trusts are interested in how the holding of this case will be applied in the future.  Estate 
planning is an area of law that is particularly susceptible to personal whims and 
idiosyncrasies.
15
  Wills may be deeply reflective of the testator’s character, beliefs, and 
values;
16
 as a result, they may contain endless variations that result in litigation.  
Therefore, it is essential to consider how the Feinberg holding might be applied to 
different fact patterns to determine the significance of its precedential value. 
¶6 Owing to the newness of this decision, few scholarly articles have addressed it.17  
This is not true of the public media sources, however, which covered the case fairly 
extensively due to the sensational facts of the family feud, the religious implications, and 
the parties’ willingness to discuss the matter publicly.
18
  Articles discussing In re Estate 
of Feinberg appeared in local and national newspapers,
19
 legal and professional 
publications,
20
 and publications by religious organizations.
21
  These articles attracted a 
large number of responses, with people arguing vehemently for both sides of the case.
22
  
                                                                                                                                            
First Amendment and the Illinois and United States constitutions, Jewish law and concerns about the future 
of the Jewish people, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  
13 See citation, for a discussion of the arguments for and against testation, Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous 
Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1290–1301 (1999). 
14 Dead-hand control is ―[t]he convergence of various legal doctrines that allow a decedent’s control of 
wealth to influence the conduct of a living beneficiary; especially, the use of executory interests that vest at 
some indefinite and remote time in the future to restrict alienability and to ensure that property remains in 
the hands of a particular family or organization.  Examples include the lawful use of conditional gifts, 
contingent future interests, and the Claflin-trust principle.  The rule against perpetuities restricts certain 
types of deadhand control . . . .‖  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 456 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―deadhand 
control‖).  
15 Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction Between Will Interpretation 
and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 100 (2005) (―Sometimes people do write wills that are 
unreasonable, quirky, idiosyncratic, and even antisocial.‖). 
16
 See id. 
17 See, e.g., Ronald Volkmer, ‘Beneficiary Restriction’ Clause is Upheld on Appeal, 37 ESTCLANNER 45 
(2010); Jeremy Macklin, Comment, The Puzzling Case of Max Feinberg: An Analysis of Conditions in 
Partial Restraints of Marriage, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 265 (2009). 
18 See infra notes 19–20. 
19 See, e.g., Ron Grossman, ‘Jewish Clause’ Divides a Family: State Courts Weigh in on a Man’s Will that 
Disinherited Any Descendant Who Married a Gentile, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2008, available at  
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-08-25/news/0808240494_1_illinois-supreme-court-jewish-judges 
(discussing In re Estate of Feinberg generally, including quotations from the parties’ lawyers and the 
parties themselves); Dan Slater,  Marry Goyim, You Get Bupkis; Illinois Court Strikes ‘Jewish Clause,’ 
WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2008, 10:42 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/08/25/marry-goyim-you-
get-bupkis-illinois-court-strikes-jewish-clause/ (briefly explicated In re Estate of Feinberg after the 
appellate court struck down the beneficiary restriction clause; there were sixty-five responses to the article 
in the form of reader comments supporting both sides of the case, most quite vehemently).  
20 See, e.g., Helen Gunnarsson, Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Jewish-Marriage Clause in Trust 
Provision, 97 ILL. B.J. 549 (providing a general description of the Illinois Supreme Court’s In re Estate of 
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¶7 This Note argues that the Illinois Supreme Court correctly upheld the beneficiary 
restriction clause of the Feinberg will as not violative of public policy because the clause 
sought neither to unreasonably restrict marriage nor to induce divorce.  This Note begins 
by presenting the Feinberg case.  Sections II and III discuss the facts and the details of its 
disposition in the lower courts, respectively.  Section IV proceeds to discuss the decision 
by the Illinois Supreme Court, analyzing the supreme court’s decision in detail, 
considering and evaluating the reasoning employed by the Justices, with particular 
scrutiny directed at the different justifications offered for the decision.  This Note 
continues in Section V by examining the case law in this area prior to Feinberg and 
assessing whether Feinberg is consistent with or represents a break from an established 
line of jurisprudence in Illinois as well as in other jurisdictions.  Finally, in Sections VI 
and VII, this Note examines the potential consequences of Feinberg and whether the 
Feinberg precedent should be applied more broadly in the future. 
II. FACTS OF IN RE ESTATE OF FEINBERG 
¶8 Max Feinberg executed a will.  He also created a trust in which, upon his death, all 
of his assets were to be placed.
23
  The trust was divided for tax purposes into two trusts, 
―Trust A‖ and ―Trust B.‖
24
  Erla, his wife, was the lifetime beneficiary of those trusts.
25
  
She had the right to invade the corpus
26
 of the trusts as a means of income.
27
  Max 
arranged the trusts so that Erla would draw income from Trust A until its assets were 
exhausted, and only then would she be entitled to draw on the assets of Trust B.
28
  Upon 
Erla’s death, any assets remaining in the trusts after paying estate taxes were to be 
combined in Trust B, a lifetime trust.
29
 
                                                                                                                                            
Feinberg decision and cautioning that the court’s close framing of the issue and fact-specific inquiry 
sidesteps the questions of whether religious restrictions are broadly permissible in testamentary 
instruments); John T. Brooks & Erika A. Alley, The Jewish Clause: How Far Can a Testator Go in Putting 
Conditions on Inheritances, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, Jan. 27, 2009,  
http://trustsandestates.com/wealth_watch/inheritance_conditions_0127/ (discussing the appellate court’s In 
re Estate of Feinberg opinion, suggesting that the Illinois Supreme Court’s willingness to hear the case 
suggests that all provisions restraining marriage, religion and family relationships may not automatically be 
struck down as against public policy). 
21 See, e.g., Gavant, supra note 9 (criticizing the appellate court’s In re Estate of Feinberg decision). 
22 See, e.g., Posting of Solomon Grundy to Slater, supra note 19, (Aug. 25, 2008, 12:09 PM) (supporting 
the appeals court’s decision to strike the provision); Posting of Diogenes to Slater, supra note 19, (Aug. 25, 
2008, 11:12 AM) (disagreeing with the appeals court’s decision to strike the provision); Posting of Liberal 
Angel to Christopher Wills, ‘Jews Only’ Inheritance Plan Allowed By Illinois Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Sept. 28, 2009, (9/28/09, 9:34PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/24/jews-only-
inheritance-pla_n_298962.html (supporting the Illinois supreme court’s decision to upheld the provision).   
23 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Ill. 2009).  Max arranged for two trusts to be created upon 
his death.  Id.  All of his assets were contained in the two trusts.  Id.   
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 The corpus of the trust means, literally, the ―body‖ of the trust.  This refers to all of the property 
transferred to a trust.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―corpus‖ as ―the trust 
principal.‖).    
27 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 891. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  A lifetime trust holds assets in trust during the lifetime of the beneficiary.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1508 (9th ed. 2009). 
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¶9 Based on Max’s plan (which assumed that Erla would outlive him), upon Erla’s 
death, fifty percent of the assets in the trust were to go to Max and Erla’s two children, 
Michael Feinberg and Leila Taylor, who would serve as co-executors of Erla’s estate.
30
  
Max’s will directed that the other fifty percent of the assets be held in trust for the living 
descendants of Michael and Leila, divided on a per stirpes basis.
31
  Each grandchild’s 
receipt of the trust assets was subject to the beneficiary restriction clause,
32
 which was 
intended to benefit those descendants who honored and furthered Max and Erla’s 
commitment to Judaism by marrying within the faith.
33
 The provision from Max’s trust 
agreement that includes the beneficiary restriction clause stated: 
 
3.5(e) A descendant of mine other than a child of mine who marries 
outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of such descendant has 
converted or converts within one year of the marriage to the Jewish faith) 
and his or her descendants shall be deemed to be deceased for all purposes 
of this instrument as of the date of such marriage.
34
 
¶10 Additionally, Max’s will granted Erla a limited lifetime power of appointment35 
over the assets of Trust B.
36
  As a result, Erla had the ability to exercise her power of 
appointment in favor of Max’s descendants only.
37
  Thus, Erla’s power of appointment 
was limited to their children and grandchildren. 
¶11 Max died in 1986.38  In 1997, Erla exercised her power of appointment over the 
trust.
39
 Erla revoked Max’s original distribution scheme and altered it in two significant 
ways.
40
 First, she changed the distribution method from per stirpes to per capita.
41
  
Second, she specified that her children and any grandchildren not deemed deceased were 
to receive a fixed sum—a one-time payment of $250,000—upon her death.
42
  
Significantly, she did not alter the essence of Max’s original beneficiary restriction 
                                               
30 See Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 891–92, 905. 
31 Id. at 891.  In this case, the division of the trust on a per stirpes basis meant that Michael’s two children 
would split one quarter of the trust assets, while Leila’s three children would divide one quarter of the trust 
assets among them.  Id. 
32 Id. at 891.  
33 Id. at 892. 
34 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
35
 Power of appointment refers to the ability of a testator to select a person who will be vested with the 
authority to dispose of property under a will or other testamentary instrument.  Power of appointment may 
be transferred only in writing, such as by will or trust.  Power of appointment may be ―general‖ if there are 
no restrictions with regards to whom the property may be distributed, or otherwise ―limited.‖  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―power of appointment‖).  A general power of 
appointment is one where the donee can dispose of the donor’s property ―in favor of anyone at all,‖ 
whereas a limited power of appointment ―restricts to whom the estate may be conveyed.‖  Id.  





41 Id.  Unlike a per stirpes distribution, a per capita distribution permitted each grandchild to take an equal 
share of the assets.  Id.  Under the per capita distribution scheme, each grandchild was treated equally, 
whereas the per stirpes distribution scheme favored Michael’s two children over Leila’s three. 
42 Id.  The $250,000 was to be paid out of the assets of Trust B.  Id.  
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clause.  If any grandchild was deemed deceased under the clause, his or her share would 
be paid to either Michael or Leila.
43
  
¶12 Between 1990 and 2001, all five grandchildren married.44  Erla died in 2003.45  At 
that time, all five grandchildren had been married for more than one year.
46
  Only one 
grandchild, Leila’s son Jon, met the requirements of the beneficiary restriction clause and 
was entitled to receive $250,000 of the trust assets.
47
  One of the grandchildren deemed 
deceased under the clause, Michael’s daughter Michele Trull, filed suit, seeking to 
invalidate the beneficiary restriction clause on public policy grounds.
48
 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE FEINBERG LITIGATION 
¶13 Controversy surrounding Erla’s estate arose almost immediately after her 2003 
death.  Three suits were filed.
49
  Granddaughter Michele Trull was a plaintiff in two of 
the suits.
50
  The co-executors, Michael and Leila, along with Leila’s husband Marshall, 
sought to have two of the suits dismissed on grounds that Michele had no interest in the 
estate because she was deemed deceased under the beneficiary restriction clause.
51
  
¶14 The trial court invalidated the beneficiary restriction clause after a trial on the 
merits, holding that the provision tended to encourage divorce or bring about a separation 
and was therefore void as a matter of public policy.
52
  Although the court stated that a 
provision intended to provide support in the event of a divorce or separation was an 
exception to this general rule,
53
 it determined that this exception was not at play in 
Feinberg.
54
  Instead, the trial court determined that the provision represented an 
impermissible restraint on marriage.
55
 
¶15 On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District, in a split decision, affirmed 
the circuit court’s decision.
56
  Citing the principle that testamentary provisions will be 
held to be invalid if they either discourage marriage or encourage divorce,
57
 the appellate 
                                               
43 Id.  Leila and Michael were not restricted in how they used the money they received from the estate.  
They could have given the shares that reverted back to them to their children if they so pleased, regardless 
of whether the children had been deemed deceased for the purposes of the will.  In re Estate of Feinberg, 
891 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (noting that being deemed deceased for the purposes of Erla’s will 
would not prevent a ―deceased‖ grandchild from inheriting the funds from a parent). 




 Id. at 891.  
48 Id. 
49 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).  The first suit was the probate of 
Erla’s estate; the second, brought by granddaughter Michele Trull, alleged that Michael Feinberg and Leila 
and Marshall Taylor ―conspired to evade estate taxes and misappropriated millions of dollars‖ from Max 
and Erla’s estates; the third case involved stock certificates registered to Max that the co-executors held and 
had failed to transfer to Max’s estate.  Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 In re Estate of Feinberg, No. 04P5093, 2006 WL 6304910 (Ill. Cir. Aug. 23, 2006). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (―The subject provision is clearly not one which meets the criteria of the exception to the rule, . . . 
which was meant to provide support in the event of a divorce or separation.‖). 
55 Id. 
56 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
57 Id. at 550. 
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court held that the beneficiary restriction clause was void because ―it seriously interferes 
with and limits the right of individuals to marry a person of their own choosing.‖
58
  The 
court based its findings primarily on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, observing that the 
Restatement ―provides that trust provisions which are contrary to public policy are 
void.‖
59
  For example, the court asserted that ―a provision that all of a beneficiary’s rights 
to a trust would terminate if he married a person who was not of a specified religion‖ 
would be void.
60
  The court also drew heavily on Illinois case law, some of which dated 
as far back as 1898, for the proposition that testamentary provisions which act as a 
restraint on marriage or induce divorce are void as against public policy.
61
  Although the 
court did acknowledge that a number of other states had upheld similar testamentary 
provisions, it declined to follow suit.
62
 
¶16 In his dissent, Judge Greiman opined that the Illinois case law relied on by the 
majority was ―wholly inapposite‖ to the Feinberg case.
63
  He lamented that ―the majority 
[opinion] places us in the minority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue,‖
64
 and 
he advocated for adopting the approach taken by several other states, especially in light 
of the greater factual similarities that he observed between the Feinberg case and case 
law from other jurisdictions.
65
  Additionally, the dissent minimized the importance of the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts
66
 and suggested greater reliance on American Law Reports, 
which concludes that the ―weight of authority, however, is to the effect that a testator has 
the right to make the enjoyment of his bounty dependent on the condition that the 
recipient renounce, embrace, or adhere to a particular religious faith.‖
67
  
¶17 Following the decision by the divided appellate court, the co-executors appealed 
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Because the case implicated public policy, the 
standard of review was de novo.
68
 
IV. DISPOSITION IN THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT 
¶18 As a preliminary matter, the supreme court declined to view the case as involving a 
religious issue, specifically rejecting a constitutional religious freedom argument 
presented by the plaintiff.
69
  Rather, the court understood Feinberg to involve ―two 
potentially competing public policies,‖ one supporting the institution of marriage and the 
                                               
58 Id. at 552. 
59
 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 550–51 (relying on In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1975); Winterland v. Winterland, 
59 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. 1945); Ransdell v. Boston, 50 N.E. 111 (Ill. 1898)).  
62 Id. at 551–52 (―[O]ther states do not follow the uniform precedent of Illinois in validating such 
precedents.‖).  The court cited to three examples of courts that upheld similar provisions.  Id. (citing 
Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank; 39 Ohio Misc. 28 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1974); In re Silverstein’s Will, 
155 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956); Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955)). 
63 Id. at 555 (Greiman, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 558. 
65 Id. at 555–57. 
66 Id. at 557 (―[T]he Restatement . . . has absolutely nothing to do with the case at bar.‖).  
67 Id. at 556 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 893 (Ill. 2009). 
69 Id. at 905 (―[T]he free exercise clause does not require a grandparent to treat grandchildren who reject his 
religious beliefs and customs in the same manner as he treats those who conform to his traditions.‖). 
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other supporting testamentary freedom.
70
  The court sought to determine whether the 
holder of a power of appointment over the assets of a trust may, without violating Illinois 
public policy, direct that the assets be distributed at her death to her descendants, 




¶19 Authored by Justice Garman, the Feinberg opinion covered three main areas: it 
discussed and offered evidence of Illinois public policy regarding freedom of testation;
72
 
it rejected the reasoning of the appellate court by distinguishing the main cases the 
appellate court had relied upon and by explaining why the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
was not applicable to the case at bar;
73
 and finally, it rejected additional sundry 
arguments proffered by the plaintiff, Michele Trull.
74
 
A. Illinois Law Supports Broad Testamentary Freedom 
¶20 Noting that neither the United States Constitution nor the Constitution of the State 
of Illinois addresses the issue of testamentary freedom,
75
 the supreme court looked 
instead to state statutes.  The supreme court identified several areas of Illinois law that 
bear witness to a public policy that supports a broad freedom of testation.
76
  First, the 
Probate Act,
77
 which governs administering and probating estates, places only two limits 
on a testator’s ability to choose his beneficiaries,
78
 neither of which was implicated in the 
case at bar.  Given the testator’s nearly unrestricted freedom to choose the object of his 
bounty under the Probate Act, the court noted that Max and Erla had no obligation to give 
anything to their grandchildren.
79
 In fact, had Erla died intestate,
80
 the estate would have 
been shared between the two children, Michael and Leila.
81
  ―Surely,‖ the court noted, 
―the grandchildren have no greater claim on their grandparents’ estate than they would 
have had on intestate estates.‖
82
 
¶21 Second, like the Probate Act governing wills, its statutory counterpart, the Trusts 
and Trustees Act,
83
 grants broad freedom with regard to the creation and administration 
                                               
70 Id. at 897. 
71 Id. at 892. 
72 Id. at 895–96. 
73 Id. at 896–903. 
74 The plaintiff’s additional arguments were dismissed rather summarily.  Id. at 903–05.  Thus, they will not 
be discussed at length in this Note. 
75 Id. at 895. 
76 Id. at 895–96. 
77 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 et seq. (2008).  
78 First, a surviving spouse may renounce a testator’s will, regardless of whether the spouse was to receive 
any benefit from it.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT.  5/2-8 (2008).  Second, a child born to a testator after the will has 
been made is entitled to receive the portion of the estate to which he would be entitled if the testator died 
intestate, unless provision for the child was made in the will or the testator’s intentions to disinherit the 
child are made clear in the will.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-10 (2008). 
79 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 895.  
80 A decedent is deemed to have died intestate when she dies without having executed a will.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 898 (9th ed. 2009) (Intestate is ―[o]f or relating to a person who has died without a valid 
will‖). 
81 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1(b) (2008). 
82 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 895. 
83 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-21 (2008) 
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of trusts. Under the Trusts and Trustees Act, a settlor
84
 may specify in the trust 
instrument ―rights, powers, duties limitations and immunities applicable to the trustee, 
beneficiary and others‖ and those provisions will control even if they depart from the 
standard provisions of the Act, provided that they are not contrary to or violative of the 
law.
85
  Essentially, settlors are given broad freedom to tailor their trusts to their personal 
specifications. 
¶22 Two other Illinois statutes further express the state’s strong public policy in favor 
of freedom of testation by weakening or abolishing contrary common law rules.  First, the 
1969 adoption of the Statute Concerning Perpetuities
86
 dampened the effect of the long-
standing common law rule against perpetuities.
87
  The Statute Concerning Perpetuities 
modifies the common law rule so that a will or trust provision violating the rule against 
perpetuities
88
 would not be void ab initio,
89
 but rather would be terminated at the 
conclusion of the perpetuities period.  Second, the Rule in Shelley’s Case Abolishment 
Act
90
 abolished a common law rule
91
 which provided that a life estate to A with a 
remainder to A’s heirs will instead give A the conveyance in fee simple.
92
  The Rule in 
Shelley’s Case frustrated the testator’s intent by effectively changing the conveyance 
from a life estate, which allowed A use of the property for the duration of her life, to fee 
simple, an unrestricted form of ownership which would permit A to sell the property or 
leave it to someone other than A’s heirs.  Abolishing the Rule allowed for greater 
testamentary freedom by giving full effect to the testator’s devise.  
¶23 As the supreme court correctly identified, these four statutes—the Probate Act, the 
Trusts and Trustees Act, the Statute Concerning Perpetuities, and the Shelley’s Case 
Abolishment Act—are consistent in their general thrust: Illinois state law supports a 
public policy of broad testamentary freedom.
93
 
B. The Supreme Court Distinguished the Main Cases Relied upon by the Appellate 
Court 
¶24 In its Feinberg decision, the supreme court examined its three prior decisions on 
which the appellate court had relied—Ransdell v. Boston,
94
 Winterland v. Winterland,
95
 
and In re Estate of Gerbing
96
—and distinguished each of them from the case at bar. 
                                               
84 A settlor is a person who establishes a trust.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (defining ―settlor‖) (9th 
ed. 2009). 
85
 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2008). 
86 1969 ILL LAWS 2893. 
87 The rule against perpetuities ―limit[s] the testator’s power to earmark gifts for remote descendants.‖ 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 394 (2d ed. 1977). 
88 The rule against perpetuities is a ―common-law rule prohibiting a grant of an estate unless the interest 
must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years . . . after the death of some person alive when the interest was 
created.‖  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (9th ed. 2009). 
89 Void ab initio means invalid from the outset. See  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1709 (9th ed. 2009) 
(noting ab initio means ―from the beginning‖). 
90 1953 ILL LAWS 1479 
91 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 345/1 (1990). 
92 Fee simple is full ownership without restriction.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 691 (9th ed. 2009) (Fee 
simple is ―[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the 
current holder dies without heirs . . . .‖).   
93 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 895–96 (Ill. 2009).  
94 Ransdell v. Boston, 50 N.E. 111 (Ill. 1898). 
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¶25 In Ransdell, an 1898 case, the court established the general rule that testamentary 
provisions that act as a restraint on marriage or encourage divorce are void as against 
public policy.
97
  Nevertheless, the Ransdell court upheld a provision giving the testator’s 
son a life estate in certain property with the stipulation that title would be conveyed to 
him only upon the death of his wife or their divorce.
98
  The court recognized this 
provision as falling under an exception to the general rule, for the testator’s purpose was 
―simply to secure the gift to his son in the manner which, in his judgment, would render it 
of the greatest benefit to him, in view of the relations then existing between him and his 
wife.‖
99
  In Feinberg, the appellate court interpreted Ransdell as providing one narrow 
exception to the general rule:
100
 where separation has already occurred and divorce is 
pending, conditioning an inheritance on divorce is acceptable and will not be viewed as 
encouraging separation or divorce.
101
  
¶26 The supreme court, however, construed Ransdell more broadly.  The court 
determined that Ransdell did not stand for just one exception, but rather that it opened the 
door to exceptions to the rule generally so that given ―certain facts and circumstances,‖
102
 
a restrictive provision could be deemed valid.  For example, such a provision can be 
viewed as intended to provide support in the event of divorce or death.  The supreme 
court further extrapolated from Ransdell that testators should be given broad freedom to 
dispose of their assets as they please, because ―there is nothing illegitimate about a 
testator’s preference for supporting a particular cause, value, or personal interest over the 
interests of potential beneficiaries, so long as the condition stated in the will or trust does 
not, at the relevant time, violate public policy.‖
103
 
¶27 The supreme court also considered Winterland and Gerbing, distinguishing them 
from the case at bar.
104
  In Winterland, the court invalidated a provision wherein a father 
directed that his son’s share of a trust be held in trust for him for the duration of his life 
―or until his present wife shall have died or been separated from him by absolute 
divorce,‖
105
 though the son and his wife were neither separated nor contemplating 
divorce.
106
  The Winterland court distinguished Ransdell, where the son and his wife 
were already separated and heading toward divorce.
107
  The Winterland court found that 
the provision, which provided a significant financial reward for divorce where no 
                                                                                                                                            
95 Winterland v. Winterland, 59 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. 1945).   
96
 In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1975).   
97 Ransdell, 50 N.E. at 114–15.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 114. 
100 Not only does Ransdell provide an exception to the general rule, but it also stands for the proposition 
that a court will consider the motive of the testator when evaluating the validity of a testamentary 
provision.  Id. at 114.   
101 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (―[T]he court in Ransdell found that 
this rule was inapplicable to the facts before it because it was clear that the marriage at issue was already in 
disrepair, with the parties separated, at the time the provision was created.‖). 
102 Ransdell, 50 N.E. at 113–14. 
103 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 904 (Ill. 2009). 
104 Id. at 896–99. 
105 Winterland v. Winterland, 59 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1945).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 663. 
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¶28 In Gerbing, the court invalidated a provision that terminated the testator’s trust and 
gave the contents of the trust to the testator’s son in the event that the son’s wife 
predeceased him or they divorced and remained divorced for two years.
109
  The court 
restated the exception established in Ransdell,
110
 but refused to ascribe such an innocent 
motive to the testator in the case at bar.
111
  The court determined instead that the testator 
was seeking to provide an incentive for divorce rather than support to her son in the event 
of a divorce.
112
  The court held that the condition was void as against public policy, 
concluding that ―[p]lainly the condition . . . is capable of exerting such a disruptive 
influence upon an otherwise normally harmonious marriage.‖
113
  
¶29 Unlike the appellate court, the supreme court found that both Winterland and 
Gerbing were factually inapposite to Feinberg.
114
  First, the provisions being challenged 
in Winterland and Gerbing provided a monetary incentive to divorce.
115
  In contrast, the 
Feinberg court determined that the beneficiary restriction clause ―does not implicate the 
principle that trust provisions that encourage divorce violate public policy‖ because the 
provision in question addressed only marriage and choice of spouse.
116
  The provision 
neither encouraged divorce nor offered any incentive for a grandchild to either divorce a 
non-Jewish spouse or to remarry a Jewish spouse.
117
  Indeed, the provision does not even 
use the word ―divorce,‖ or make any reference to a separation or termination of marriage.  
Rather, the intent of Erla’s provision was to reward with a bequest ―those grandchildren 




¶30 In Illinois, it is well settled that a will speaks as of the date of the testator’s death.119  
In the instant case, after Erla exercised her power of appointment,
120
 all contingencies 
would be settled as of the date of Erla’s death
121
 because the determination as to whether 
the grandchildren would receive their share of the trust assets was dependent on their 
marital status as of that date, as well as whether there remained any assets in the trust to 
                                               
108 Id. 
109 In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ill. 1975). 
110 Id. at 32. 
111 Id. at 32–33. 
112 Id. at 33. 
113
 Id. 
114 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 896–99 (Ill. 2009).  
115 Winterland v. Winterland, 59 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1945) (Testator’s son George’s shares shall be kept in 
trust ―so long as he may live or until his present wife shall have died or been separated from him by 
absolute divorce.‖); Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d at 31 (―[I]n the event Arlie Gerbing and Frank Gerbing, Jr. are 
divorced . . . my trustee is directed to pay . . . the remaining principal of the trust property and all accrued 
dividends or interest accumulated thereon to my said son.‖). 
116 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 899. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. at 903. 
119 Matter of Estate of Gehrt, 480 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (―In Illinois, it is well established 
that the will only speaks as of the date of death of the testator.‖). 
120 Erla exercised her power of appointment only partially.  She could have eliminated the beneficiary 
restriction clause entirely, but rather she chose to retain the provision, altering only the distribution scheme.  
Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 892. 
121 Id. at 900–01. 





  Nothing that occurred after the date of Erla’s death would affect the 
disposition of Erla’s assets for the purposes of the beneficiary restriction clause.
123
 
¶31 The beneficiary restriction clause did not provide that a grandchild deemed 
deceased for the purpose of the will could be ―resurrected‖ to receive their share of the 
trust assets upon subsequently divorcing the non-Jewish spouse or remarrying to a Jewish 
spouse.
124
  Indeed, the Feinberg court noted that because no contingencies remained at 
Erla’s death—all of the grandchildren were married and the will provided for a one-time 
payment based on circumstances at the time of her death
125
—the Feinberg provision had 
no prospective effect that might influence a descendant’s choice to marry or divorce.
126
  
¶32 Erla’s appointment created a condition precedent, meaning that a condition had to 
be met before the grandchildren would receive their share of the trust assets.
127
  In this 
case, of course, that condition was that the grandchildren had to marry a Jewish spouse or 
a non-Jewish spouse who converted within one year of marriage.
128
  The supreme court 
found that a condition precedent would generally be upheld
129
 because until the condition 
was satisfied, the beneficiary only had an expectancy interest.
130
  Thus, the beneficiary 
restriction clause did not seek to exert dead-hand control
131
 or to influence the future 
conduct of the grandchildren because the provision did ―not operate prospectively to 
encourage the grandchildren to make certain choices regarding marriage.‖
132
  On the date 
of Erla’s death, the condition was either met or not met based on the marital status of the 
grandchildren.
133
  There was nothing the grandchildren could have done to change their 
eligibility.
134
  Ultimately, the court found that the grandchildren’s right to marry was not 




¶33 In addition to finding Winterland and Gerbing factually inapposite,136 the supreme 
court noted without further comment that the line of cases relied on by the appellate court 
dated back to 1898.
137
  Curiously enough, however, the supreme court cited Shackelford 
                                               
122 Id. at 891, 903. 
123 See id. at 903. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 891–92.   
126 See id.  As far as the provision was concerned, there was nothing to be gained from a divorce or 
remarriage after Erla’s death.  Id. at 903. 
127 Id.  
128
 Id. at 891.   
129 Id. at 897.  In contrast, a condition subsequent, such as a blanket prohibition on marriage, would likely 
be invalidated.  Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Posner’s book, Economic Analysis of the Law, discusses dead-hand control exerted through conditional 
gifts.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 18.7 (7th ed. 2007) (contrasting 
testamentary gifts with inter vivos gifts and suggesting that courts should have the power to modify 
conditions placed on testamentary gifts because of the impossibility of ―recontracting‖ by testator and 
devisee). 




136 Id. at 898–99 (―We disagree with the appellate court’s conclusion regarding the similarity of the present 
case to the cited cases.‖).  
137 Id. at 892. 




 a 1857 case from the Illinois Supreme Court.  The court found Shackelford to 
be factually apposite to the case at bar because the challenged provision involved the 
decision to marry, rather than a provision providing an incentive to divorce.
139
  In 
Shackelford, the testator left his estate to his widow until she remarried,
140
 with the 
remainder to his four children, subject to the condition that they not marry before the age 
of twenty-one.
141
  If any of his children married before the age of twenty-one that child 
would receive one dollar only.
142
  In upholding the provision, the court concluded that 
―the testator may impose reasonable and prudent restraints upon the marriage of the 
objects of his bounty, by means of conditions precedent, or subsequent, or by 
limitations.‖
143
  As an example of an impermissible restraint, the court noted that the 
testator ―may not . . . impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of his bounty.‖
144
  
Generally, the testator may impose a partial restraint on marriage, but may not absolutely 
prohibit the marriage of a party.
145
 
¶34 Despite finding that the partial restraint on marriage was reasonable, the 
Shackelford court still allowed the daughter who violated the provision to receive the 
inheritance.
146
  In so ruling, the court relied upon her ignorance of the restrictive 
provision and a fraudulent representation by her brother, an executor of the will, whom 
the court indicated had a financial interest in depriving his sister of her inheritance.
147
  
Feinberg presented no such circumstances.  The Feinberg court accepted the Shackelford 
conclusion that a partial restraint on marriage was reasonable, but ultimately found that 
the beneficiary restriction clause did ―not operate as a restriction on marriage‖ at all 
because ―it operated only upon Erla’s death to determine which grandchildren, if any, 
would share in the proceeds of the trust.‖
148
  The supreme court noted, a ―will speaks as 
of the date of death of the testator.‖
149
 
¶35 Unlike Shackelford, where the children’s interests vested upon the death of their 
father,
150
 the Feinberg grandchildren had a mere expectancy interest because the terms of 
the trust were subject to change at any time before Erla’s death if she chose to exercise 
her power of appointment.
151
  Since Max gave Erla testamentary and appointment power 
                                               
138 Id. at 899–901.  
139 Id. at 899. 




143 Id. at 214. 
144 Id. 
145 As a general rule, a testator may not impose a complete restraint on marriage, but rather only a 
reasonable partial restraint on marriage.  See id. at 214.  However, there is one exception to the rule.  A 
testator may impose a condition whereby the testator’s spouse will forfeit any right to the spouse’s estate by 
subsequently remarrying.  Id. at 214–15. 
146 Id. at 218. 
147 Id. at 217–18 (finding that ―it would be a monstrous piece of injustice to enforce this forfeiture against 
her‖ because her brother, the executor of the will, kept the plaintiff in ignorance of the condition for his 
own monetary benefit). 
148 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 903 (Ill. 2009). 
149 Id. at 901. 
150 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 211, 213 (Ill. 1857). 
151 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 900–01.   
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over the trusts, the grandchildren only had an expectancy
152
 that they might receive some 
of the trust assets when Erla’s life estate was over at her death.
153
  Nothing was settled 
until Erla’s death.  Erla could have exercised her appointment power to exclude the 
grandchildren entirely.  Or, even if Erla still provided for the grandchildren in her will, 
she could have exhausted the assets in the trust so the grandchildren would not have 
received anything from the estate.  In essence, it was not a certainty that the 
grandchildren would receive anything from Max and Erla’s estate. 
¶36 Moreover, unlike the Shackelford daughter,154 the grandchildren were not heirs at 
law.
155
  Heirs at law usually include the decedent’s spouse (if alive) and children.  In 
Illinois, and as a general matter, grandchildren are not considered heirs at law.
156
  Outside 
of being named as beneficiaries in the will, therefore, the Feinberg grandchildren had no 
legal claim to their grandparents’ estate.  In fact, had the grandchildren not been named in 
the will, Michele Trull would likely not have had standing to challenge the will.  In dicta, 
the Feinberg court noted an additional consequence of the grandchildren not being heirs 
at law: it determined that notice of the provision in question, though of critical 
importance in Shackelford,
157
 was not relevant in Feinberg because the grandchildren 
were not heirs at law.
158
  This underscores the court’s position that the grandchildren 
possessed fewer legal rights and had a weaker claim to the trust assets because they were 
not heirs at law. 
C. The Supreme Court Rejected the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
¶37 Next, the supreme court rejected the applicability of the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts,
159
 a source of law on which the appellate court had relied rather heavily.
160
  The 
                                               
152 In the lexicon of trusts and estates, an expectancy interest refers to a situation where an individual 
expects to receive something, such as property, but is not assured that they will receive it.  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 658 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―expectancy‖).  For example, if Tom’s will contains a 
provision devising a sum of money to Susan, Susan has only an expectancy interest in the money because 
Tom could alter the will to exclude Susan at any time before his death. 
153 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 900–01. 
154 Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 215. 
155 Id.  An heir at law, or simply an heir, is someone who would be the beneficiary of all or a share of an 
estate if the owner of the estate was to die intestate, or without a will.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining ―heirs‖). 
156 The laws of intestacy generally determine who shall be heirs at law and what share of a decedent’s 
estate heirs at law shall receive by examining executed wills to determine who decedents tend to provide 
for and what percentage of their estate they give to a type of beneficiary.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 898 
(9th ed. 2009) (defining ―intestate‖). 
157 Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 217–18. 
158 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 901 (Ill. 2009) (―[W]hile the record is unclear whether any or 
all of the grandchildren were aware of the existence of the beneficiary restriction clause, because they had 
no vested interest to protect, they were not entitled to notice of the condition.‖). 
159 Id. at 902–03 (finding that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts was not applicable because, among other 
reasons, ―[t]he validity of a trust provision is not at issue‖).  In addition to deeming the Restatement 
inapplicable to the case at bar, the court also made clear that it had not yet accepted or endorsed the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, commenting that ―this court has, on several occasions, cited various sections 
[of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts] with approval‖ and further noting that ―[w]e have not yet had 
reason to consider whether any section of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which was adopted in 2003, is 
an accurate expression of Illinois law and we need not do so in this case.‖  Id. at 902. 
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supreme court explained that ―[t]he validity of a trust provision is not at issue, as the 
distribution provision of Max’s trust was revoked when Erla exercised her power of 
appointment.  Her distribution scheme was in the nature of a testamentary provision.‖
161
 
¶38 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts may have been germane to Max’s original 
instrument, which created a lifetime trust and provided for the trust assets to be divided 
among his children and grandchildren upon Erla’s death.
162
  However, after Erla 
exercised her power of appointment, the beneficiary restriction clause, which now 
provided for a one-time, fixed-sum payment of $250,000 to each of her children and 
grandchildren, became a testamentary provision,
163
 rather than a trust provision.
164
  The 
difference is that Max’s distribution scheme divided the trust and paid money out to his 
beneficiaries, his children and grandchildren, pursuant to the trust documents, whereas 
Erla’s distribution scheme called for a one-time $250,000 payment to be paid pursuant to 
a provision in her will.
165
 
¶39 The supreme court was correct in drawing the distinction between Max’s trust 
provision and Erla’s testamentary provision.
166
  This seems simple enough, yet the 
confusion lies in the fact that Erla’s testamentary provision still implicates the trust.  
Under Erla’s testamentary provision, the money for the $250,000 payments was to come 
from the trust assets.
167
  Be that as it may, the involvement of the trust was merely 
incidental to Erla’s distribution scheme as governed by the testamentary provision.  
¶40 It is critical to note that trusts and wills are distinct legal instruments.  It would be 
misleading and mistaken to extend the applicability of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
to other testamentary instruments.  Trusts and wills share many similarities and are often 
used in tandem, but they are not governed by all of the same rules and laws.  As a result, 
the two may not be treated interchangeably.  Moreover, regardless of its applicability to 
the subject matter in question, the Restatement is not controlling.
168
  Though considered 
persuasive authority, it is important to note that Restatements are not law and courts are 
not required to defer to them.
169
 
¶41 The supreme court correctly held that the appellate court’s reliance on the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts was unjustified because Erla’s payment scheme was not 
                                                                                                                                            
160 See In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (―We hold that under Illinois law 
and under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the provision in the case before us is invalid because it 
seriously interferes with and limits the right of individuals to marry a person of their own choosing.‖). 
161
 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 902. 
162 Note that Restatements are not law; however, they are generally accorded persuasive authority by 
courts.  See id.; Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 998 (―The Restatement (Third) of Trusts has previously been cited 
as persuasive authority by this court.‖). 
163 The $250,000 payments were to come from assets that, incidentally, were held in trust, but the 
distribution scheme operated as a testamentary provision, not a trust provision.  Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 
902. 
164 Id. at 891–92. 
165 Id. at 891. 
166 Id. at 902. 
167 Id. at 891–92. 
168 Id. at 902 (noting that various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts have been cited with 
approval by the Illinois supreme court, but that the court has not yet had reason to consider any section of 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and does not see fit to do so in the case at bar). 
169 The supreme court noted that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts had not yet been considered by the 
court.  Id.   
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V. THE FEINBERG DECISION IS JUSTIFIABLE LEGALLY, MORALLY, AND SOCIALLY 
A. Feinberg Is Legally Sound but not Solidly Supported 
¶42 The supreme court was correct in distinguishing Winterland and Gerbing as 
factually inapposite in that both provisions in question discussed the contingency of 
divorce.  The provisions in those cases, unlike in Feinberg, provided an incentive, a 
monetary award, for divorce, thus undercutting the public policy of promoting the 
institution of marriage by tending to induce divorce. 
¶43 The supreme court’s decision, while well-reasoned, should have provided a more 
solid foundation for its decision.  The greater part of the decision focused on explaining 
defects in the appellate court’s reasoning, rather than setting forth positive law in support 
of upholding the beneficiary restriction clause.  The supreme court deemed the cases 
cited by the appellate court factually inapposite, and distinguished them accordingly.
171
  
It also explained why the appellate court’s reliance on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
was misplaced.
172
  However, the court neglected to consider other states’ case law on the 
subject, which, by providing positive law to underpin the decision, would have provided 
the most persuasive authority in support of its holding. 
¶44 In its opinion invalidating the beneficiary restriction clause, the appellate court 
briefly acknowledged the wealth of case law supporting the opposite conclusion.
173
  The 
appellate court disposed of these cases quickly, corralling them into a single paragraph.
174
  
Judge Greiman’s dissent seized on this weakness in the majority’s opinion.
175
  Greiman 
relied primarily on case law from other jurisdictions and pointedly noted that the 




¶45 In its own opinion, however, the supreme court failed to discuss case law from 
other jurisdictions.  For the most part, this case law leans heavily toward upholding such 
testamentary provisions.  In so doing, the supreme court let pass an important opportunity 
to bolster its holding.  Instead, the court’s decision is very narrowly tailored to the facts 
of the case at bar, and the opinion leaves open many questions as to the disposition of 
similar cases in the future.  If the court had better explained and supported its decision, 
Illinois law would benefit from greater predictability. 
¶46 Cases from other jurisdictions such as Gordon v. Gordon,177 Shapira v. Union 
National Bank,
178
 In re Estate of Keffalas,
179
 and In re Silverstein’s Will,
180
 which were 
                                               
170 Id. at 902. 
171 Id. at 896–99. 
172 Id. at 902–03. 
173 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 551–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 555. 
176 Id. 
177 Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955). 
178 Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1974). 
179 In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1967). 
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cited in the appellate court decision,
181
 are factually very similar to Feinberg and support 
the supreme court’s decision.  The reasoning in those opinions is well-founded and would 
have provided additional support for the supreme court’s holding. 
¶47 In Shapira v. Union National Bank, a 1974 case from the Court of Common Pleas 
of Ohio, a testator stipulated that his son was to receive his share of the testator’s estate 
only if he was married to a Jewish woman at the time of the testator’s death, or if he 
married a Jewish woman within seven years of the testator’s death.
182
  The court upheld 
the provision, finding that partial restraints on marriage
183
 are reasonable and not contrary 
to public policy,
184
 and that inheritances conditioned on the beneficiary’s marrying within 
a particular religious faith are reasonable.
185
  Additionally, the court noted that ―this court 
is not being asked to enforce any restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira’s constitutional 
right to marry.  Rather, this court is being asked to enforce the testator’s restriction upon 
his son’s inheritance.‖
186
  The provision imposed a partial restraint on marriage for the 
limited purpose of receiving an inheritance, but did not impose a restraint on marriage in 
the general sense.  The partial restraint was found to be reasonable given the son’s access 
to eligible Jewish women
187
 and the generous time frame—seven years—he was given to 
find a Jewish mate.
188
  Finally, the court noted that the fact that the money was to be 
gifted over to the State of Israel in the event that the son did not marry a Jewish woman 
within seven years was evidence of the testator’s non-punitive intent.
189
 
¶48 Similar to Shapira, the supreme court in Feinberg noted that the beneficiary 
restriction clause did not truly constrain the descendants in any way, but rather merely 
created consequences, albeit financially significant consequences, for their choice of 
spouse.
190
  Even if the beneficiary restriction clause could be considered a restraint on 
marriage, it was only a partial restraint because it conditioned, but did not entirely 
prevent, marriage.  Additionally, as the Feinberg court pointed out, it was clear that Max 
and Erla’s provision was not intended for control purposes; rather, they wished to reward 
those grandchildren who married within the Jewish faith.
191
 
¶49 In In re Silverstein’s Will,192 the Surrogate’s Court of Queens County, New York 
upheld a testamentary provision whereby the testator provided that his grandchildren’s 
shares of his estate were to be ―paid to each on the date of their marriage and provided 
                                                                                                                                            
180 In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956). 
181 Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d at 551–52. 
182 Shapira, 39 Ohio Misc. at 28–29.  
183
 The Shapira court further noted that the condition in question was a partial restraint on marriage, not a 
restraint on the freedom of religious practice.  Id. at 33–34.  The court indicated that a testamentary gift 
conditioned on marriage to someone of a particular religion was distinguishable from a testamentary gift 
conditioned on the religious faith of the beneficiary and that the latter might be invalidated by the 
invocation of the free exercise clause.  Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 31. 
187 Id. at 37. 
188 Id. at 38. 
189 Id. 
190 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 903 (Ill. 2009) (―Michele’s choices regarding when to marry 
and whom to marry were entirely unrestricted, even though, as it turns out, those choices did have 
consequences for her.‖). 
191 Id. at 903. 
192 In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1956). 
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they marry a person of Hebrew faith.‖
193
  The court accepted the general rule that partial 
restraints on marriage, provided they are reasonable, do not violate public policy.
194
  The 
court further construed reasonable partial restraints on marriage to mean that 
―[c]onditions not to marry a person of a particular faith or race are not invalid.‖
195
 
¶50 In Gordon v. Gordon,196 a 1955 case from the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, the testator’s will provided that any of the testator’s children who married 
a person not born in the Jewish faith was to be deemed deceased for the purpose of the 
instrument.
197
  Thus, the testator’s condition was more restrictive than that in Feinberg.
198
  
In Gordon, one son, Harold, married a non-Jewish woman in a civil ceremony.  The 
woman subsequently converted to Judaism.  Following the conversion, Harold and his 
wife underwent a rabbinical ceremony of marriage.  The court adopted the rule that 
partial restraints on marriage are considered valid unless found to be unreasonable,
199
 and 
construed the rule to mean that ―an inducement by way of gift to adopt or adhere to a 
particular religious belief is not a denial of religious freedom.‖
200
  The court opined that 
the condition did not restrict religious freedom because it did not consider or seek to 
restrict the spouse’s religious beliefs at the time of marriage, but merely stipulated that 
the spouse’s parents must have been of the Jewish faith at the time that the spouse was 
born.
201
  Ultimately, the court concluded that even a restriction conditioned on the 
religion of the parents of a prospective spouse was reasonable.
202
  The Gordon restriction 
is significantly more stringent than the Feinberg beneficiary restriction clause; the 
Feinberg beneficiary restriction clause does not specify that the spouse has to be of 
Jewish parentage, and explicitly accepts converts.
203
 
¶51 In In re Estate of Keffalas,204 a 1967 case from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
the testator left a bequest of $2,000 to each of his children, provided that they marry a 
spouse of ―true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox religion,‖
205
 thus imposing a 
condition on both the ethnic heritage and religion of the prospective spouses.  The will 
also provided the same $2,000 bequest to any child who initially married a non-Greek but 
                                               
193 Id. at 599. 
194 Id. 
195 Id.  
196 Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955). 
197 Id. at 230. 
198 According to Jewish law, the religion of a child is passed down through the mother.  Rebecca Weiner, 
Who Is a Jew?, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY,  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/whojew1.html.  Thus, a child born of a Jewish mother 
and a non-Jewish father would be Jewish.  Id.  However, some Jews reject this and consider a child Jewish 
only if born of two Jewish parents.  Id.  Other Jews are less strict, and consider a child Jewish if either one 
of the parents is Jewish, if the child is reared in a Jewish household, or if the child observes Jewish customs 
and rituals.  Id.  The Feinberg beneficiary restriction clause did not specify that the grandchildren’s spouses 
had to be born of two Jewish parents, ostensibly accepting any spouse who considered themselves Jewish 
by birth or conversion, regardless of parentage.  Therefore, the Feinberg provision is less strict than the 
Gordon provision. 
199 Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234. 
200 Id. at 233. 
201 Id. at 235. 
202 Id. at 234. 
203 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
204 In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1967). 
205 Id. at 250. 
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later, following either death or divorce, remarried to a person of Greek heritage and the 
Orthodox religion.
206
  The court invalidated the provision as conducive to divorce.
207
  
Furthermore, the court named as the distinguishing factor ―whether the disposition is 
reasonably related to the contingency of divorce.‖
208
  The court found that providing a 
monetary incentive, even as little as $2,000, for divorce and remarriage to someone of 
Greek heritage and the Orthodox religion was conducive to divorce.
209
 
¶52 As the cases above make evident, the case law from other jurisdictions supports the 
holding of the Feinberg court.  Most other cases involve the testator’s children, who 
would inherit in the event that their parent died intestate, thus making them heirs at law.  
Feinberg is a unique case because it involves the testator’s grandchildren, who are not 
heirs at law.  The grandchildren had an expectancy that they might inherit at the 
conclusion of Erla’s life estate based on how Erla had exercised her appointment power; 
however, they had no vested interest until Erla died without having changed the 
testamentary scheme to exclude them.
210
  Because they had no vested interest, the 




¶53 The Feinberg holding is largely restricted to the facts of the case as a result of the 
reasoning and support the supreme court utilized.  Case law from other jurisdictions, as 
discussed above, supports the holding and helps define the contours of the rule by 
including a more diverse set of similar factual situations.  Had the supreme court included 
case law from other jurisdictions for support, it would have established a more clear 
precedent rather than potentially limiting the precedent established in Feinberg to the 
case’s particular facts.  A more well-supported decision would provide greater guidance 
to the lower courts, thus leading to the correct outcome more often in similar cases.  
B. Feinberg Correctly Favors the Public Policy Goal of Allowing Testamentary 
Freedom 
¶54 Socially, the Feinberg decision strikes an appropriate balance between the 
competing public policies of supporting testamentary freedom and safeguarding the 
institution of marriage.  Testators should have the right to distribute their assets as they 
see fit, especially when the provision is not punitive in nature, but rather is intended as an 
extension or fulfillment of a deeply-held belief.  The court accepted Michael Feinberg’s 
argument that the clause was ―intended to encourage and support Judaism and 
preservation of Jewish culture in [Max’s] family.‖
212
  Max and Erla’s method, though 
surely frustrating for at least some of their grandchildren, was benign and intended to 
advance their beliefs. 
                                               
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 251. 
208 Id. at 250. 
209 Id. at 250–51. 
210 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 900–01 (Ill. 2009). 
211 Id. at 901. 
212 Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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¶55 Courts generally investigate the testator’s motive when determining whether or not 
to uphold a testamentary provision.
213
  Where a provision is punitive in nature or 
motivated by an interest in furthering a prejudicial, bigoted, or malevolent agenda, the 
provision is likely to be held unenforceable.
214
  For example, if Max and Erla had 
imposed the beneficiary restriction clause with the express intent to avoid intermarriage 
with non-Jewish people because they believed that non-Jewish people were an inferior 
class, the court would have had a responsibility to consider the state’s public policy 
interest and not act in furtherance of a prejudicial belief.  The Feinberg court competently 
performed a balancing test by evaluating the nature of the clause and the testator’s motive 
and weighing those factors against the value of testamentary freedom.  The court 
correctly found the beneficiary restriction clause to be non-punitive in nature and 
benevolently motivated; therefore, having laid the public policy concerns to rest, 
testamentary freedom triumphed. 
C. The Feinberg Decision Is Morally Correct 
¶56 The grandchildren had no natural legal claim to Max and Erla’s assets.  As the 
Illinois supreme court noted, had Max and Erla died intestate, their estate would have 
been divided between their two children.
215
  Therefore, to include their grandchildren in 
the disposition of their estate was a voluntary and purposeful act of beneficence and 
largesse.  Max and Erla accumulated these assets over their lifetimes.  The grandchildren 
had no legal right to this money.
216
 
¶57 Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s arguments,217 the supreme court appropriately 
relied on the fact that the Feinberg beneficiary restriction clause did not restrict the 
grandchildren’s action in any way.
218
  As a matter of course, courts consider the impact 
of a restrictive provision on the beneficiaries.
219
  In this case, it was clear that the 
beneficiary restriction clause did not unduly restrict the grandchildren’s marital choices, 
in light of the fact that four of the five grandchildren married non-Jewish spouses.  In 
fact, the Feinberg grandchildren acted freely in choosing their spouses.  Just as the 
grandchildren were free to marry whomever they pleased, so too should Max and Erla be 
free to distribute their wealth as they saw fit.  
                                               
213 See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28, 38 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1974) (finding 
that a ―gift over‖ clause providing that if a son failed to marry a Jewish spouse his share of the estate would 
go to the state of Israel demonstrates the ―depth of the testator’s provision‖ and indicates that the purpose 
of the clause was not punitive in nature); see also Sherman, supra note 13, at 1307.  Courts may void a 
testamentary provision that tends to disrupt marital harmony or induce divorce regardless of whether the 
testator’s motives are benign, malicious, or indifferent.  Id. at 1310–11. 
214 Sherman, supra note 13, at 1307.   
215 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 2009) (―Surely, the grandchildren have no greater 
claim on their grandparents’ testate estates than they would have had on intestate estates.‖). 
216 See supra notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
217 Id. at 904–05 (noting that plaintiff Michele Trull argued that the beneficiary restriction clause 
―discourages lawful marriage and interferes with the fundamental right to marry, which is protected by the 
constitution‖).   
218 Id. at 903 (―Michele’s choices regarding when to marry and whom to marry were entirely 
unrestricted.‖). 
219 William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: Exploring 
the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43, 64–65 (2005). 
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¶58 The plaintiff’s arguments never acknowledge any benign purpose to the beneficiary 
restriction clause.  Rather, the plaintiff suggests that the clause was punitive in nature and 
interfered with her right to marry.
220
  Yet, both Max and Erla and their grandchildren had 
something to lose based on the beneficiary restriction clause.  Had the grandchildren 
married within the Jewish faith, they would have been entitled to receive the $250,000 
payment, and they also would have honored and furthered Max and Erla’s commitment to 
the Jewish faith—a gain for both sides.  Yet at the same time, when the grandchildren did 
as they pleased by marrying outside of the faith, they repudiated Max and Erla’s wishes, 
and lost their opportunity for $250,000.  What the grandchildren had no right to, as the 
supreme court recognized, was to reject their grandparents’ clearly expressed beliefs and 
still expect to collect $250,000—especially where the grandchildren were only included 
in the will thanks to the grandparents’ generosity. 
VI. FEINBERG SHOULD BE CONSTRUED BROADLY 
¶59 The unique nature of the Feinberg decision raises many questions about its impact 
on future cases.  The supreme court determined that Max’s trust provision was not at 
issue because the distribution provision of Max’s trust was revoked when Erla exercised  
her power of appointment.
221
  In so doing, the court left open the question of whether 
Feinberg will be applicable to trust provisions. 
¶60 Feinberg should be applicable to trust provisions.  The supreme court’s 
pronouncement that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
222
 was not applicable to the case at 
bar should not be construed to mean that the Restatement is at odds with the holding.  
Indeed, the court construed the beneficiary restriction clause consistently with the 
Restatement.  The applicable Restatement comment only invalidates a trust provision ―if 
it tends to encourage disruption of a family relationship or to discourage formation or 
resumption of such a relationship.‖
223
  The Restatement comment continues, saying that 
―a trust provision is ordinarily invalid if it tends to seriously to interfere with or inhibit . . 
. the exercise of freedom to marry.‖
224
  Consistent with that provision, the Feinberg court 
determined that the beneficiary restriction clause did not, in fact, inhibit the descendants’ 
freedom to marry. 
¶61 Moreover, though the supreme court distinguished the three cases relied on by the 
appellate court—Ransdell, Winterland, and Gerbing—it did so because of their factual 
differences from Feinberg, not because they involved trust provisions, rather than 
testamentary provisions.  The court distinguished these cases as factually inapposite 
because the provisions they addressed essentially offered a financial incentive to divorce, 
which was not the case with the provision in question in Feinberg. 
¶62 The Feinberg decision also raises the question of whether its holding should extend 
to cases where the plaintiff is an heir at law.  The answer is clearly yes.  The Feinberg 
court distinguished between heirs at law and the plaintiff, a grandchild with a mere 
expectancy interest.
225
  The court did not, however, address whether a provision like the 
                                               
220 Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 904–05. 
221 Id. at 902. 
222 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 cmt. j. (2003). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 900–01 (Ill. 2009).  
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beneficiary restriction clause should be equally valid where it applies to heirs at law, such 
as the children of a testator.  On this point the applicable cases from other jurisdictions, 
discussed earlier in this Note, are instructive.  Shapira, Silverstein, and Gordon all pit 
children, heirs at law, against their testator parents.
226
  In each of these cases, where the 
plaintiffs were heirs at law with a vested interest in the estate, the courts upheld the 
provisions in question as valid on the basis that the provisions were partial, reasonable 
restraints on marriage and provided no inducement to divorce.
227
  Thus, similar 
provisions should be held to be equally applicable to heirs at law.  However, as the court 
determined in Shackelford, heirs at law and others with a vested interest are entitled to the 




VII. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEINBERG DECISION 
¶63 Feinberg primarily affects two parties: attorneys who practice in the area of estate 
planning, and private individuals who might look to a testamentary provision to promote 
personal beliefs.  Feinberg made clear that to be upheld, a testamentary provision that 
places conditions on a beneficiary’s share of the estate must strike a balance so as to not 
be so restrictive as to be voided as contrary to public policy.  One way to do this is to 
make clear that the intent of the provision is beneficent and not punitive or intended to 
promote hatred or prejudice.
229
  
¶64 Though the beneficiary restriction clause in Feinberg was upheld, it is clear that 
such provisions will continue to be subject to scrutiny by courts.  Moreover, Feinberg 
does not provide clear guidance because the court carefully narrowed the issue to the 
facts before it, concluding ―[b]ecause no grandchild had a vested interest in the trust 
assets and because the distribution plan . . . has no prospective application . . . the 
beneficiary restriction clause does not violate public policy.‖
230
  To avoid the uncertainty 
that remains in this area of law due to Feinberg’s limited precedential value, estate 
planners and testators should consider skirting the issue entirely.  There are other means 
of promoting personal beliefs and values that are less likely than testamentary provisions 
to become the subject of litigation.  Some options include inter vivos gifts,
231
 which avoid 
the issue of dead-hand control; life estates, a transfer of interests which can be effectuated 
without the use of a will and can therefore avoid probate;
232
 and insurance, which also 
passes outside of probate.
233
 
                                               
226 See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1974); In re Silverstein’s 
Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956); Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955). 
227 See supra notes 186–209 and accompanying text. 
228 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 211, 215–16 (Ill. 1857) (finding that a provision restricting marriage of the 
testator’s children until the age of twenty-one is presumably valid, but for the fact that the plaintiff did not 
have notice of the provision). 
229 See, e.g., Shapira, 39 Ohio Misc. at 38. 
230 In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d, 888, 905–06 (Ill. 2009). 
231 See Sherman, supra note 13, at 1301. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
Vol. 6:1] Orly Henry 
237 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶65 In Feinberg, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that a beneficiary restriction 
clause which disinherited grandchildren who married outside the Jewish faith did not 
violate public policy, which clearly supports both broad testamentary freedom and the 
institution of marriage.  The court determined that the beneficiary restriction clause had 
no prospective effect, and therefore did not seek to exert dead-hand control over the 
grandchildren.  The beneficiary restriction clause did not restrict the grandchildren’s 
ability to marry, or their choice of spouse.  Moreover, the supreme court found that the 
clause did not induce divorce because it did not mention or provide any incentive for 
divorce or remarriage.  In addition to legal concerns, the Feinberg decision is also 
justifiable on moral and social grounds and is consistent with case law from other 
jurisdictions.  Therefore, the Feinberg case should be considered instructive by attorneys 
practicing in the area of trusts and estates as to what types of restrictive conditions and 
clauses will be upheld.  Finally, the Feinberg holding, though narrow, should be 
construed broadly in its application to future cases because public policy supporting 
testamentary freedom should trump the intrusion of the state into matters that are private 
and personal, such as who should have the right to decide how the fruits of a lifetime of 
hard work are distributed. 
